Lead image by AP Photo.
Fortunately, Washington has been dealing with the FAR for years, transcending Republican and Democratic administrations, albeit confined to certain well-defined functional areas: migration, sea-air rescue, counternarcotics, oil pollution response and the face-to-face meetings at Guantánamo Naval Base’s northeast gate. Just as the latter has opened channels of communications between our two militaries, U.S. Coast Guard involvement with the Cubans has as well. Since Washington posted its first Coast Guard officer to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana in the late ’90s, cooperation has broadened in a range of areas, focusing on migration, counternarcotics and maritime issues. The Coast Guard “drug interdiction specialist,” in fact, has had closer working relations with the Cuban government than any other American official and is frequently invited by his Cuban counterparts on work-related trips outside of Havana while U.S. diplomats are confined to a 25-mile radius of the capital. The Coast Guard representative, furthermore, is often approached by Cuban officials with messages unrelated to his official portfolio.
The FAR brigadiers who have conducted the Guantánamo talks likewise have sought on occasion to expand the discussion beyond issues directly related to the base. The reason for the Cuban military’s probing our military via the Coast Guard and at Guantánamo is twofold: to try to end-run Washington’s political leadership and make inroads directly with our uniformed services, soldier-to-soldier—a rather naive approach—and to send a subliminal message to Washington. A former senior U.S. diplomat who served in Havana believes FAR officials have sought closer rapport with their American military counterparts in order to communicate that they “can be dealt with constructively” and “are a force for stability.” In doing so, they are drawing a subtle distinction between Cuba’s career military and the old revolutionary guard of Fidel. If this indeed is valid, it goes without saying that such an approach has President Raúl Castro’s explicit blessing, which would seem contradictory. But Cuba unerringly has proven to be a Rubik’s cube of policy puzzles.
The former diplomat also suspects the Cuban military leadership is seeking Washington’s trust so as to obtain assurances that the U.S. “will not pull an Iraq” on them—i.e., encourage the wholesale dismantling of the FAR should the fidelista system come crashing down, as happened with the former communist regimes in Eastern Europe. As in Iraq, such a scenario would invite chaos.
A former senior U.S. Coast Guard officer who has had extensive dealings with Cuban officials told me that the FAR is the “center of gravity” for influencing decision-making in Havana, including after the Castros are gone. The big decisions, he adds, “are being made by the Ministry of the FAR (MINFAR) as opposed to the Communist Party.” He observes that “if the U.S. wants to influence decisions in Havana, it needs to start building a relationship with the FAR now.”
What is the best way to proceed? Until the Castro brothers depart the scene, political realties on the U.S. side dictate caution. Until the day arrives when a more representative and democratic government is established in Cuba, Washington must not be seen as cozying up to the Castro-imposed apparat. At the same time, however, it must begin the process of establishing connections with those mid-level FAR officers who are likely to be key players in a post-Castro Cuba. MINFAR is “both the center of reform and the opposition to reform,” according to the ex-Coast Guard senior officer. In other words, there is tension behind the scenes between old-guard fidelista officers and younger technocrat/entrepreneur officers. Interestingly, sensitivity to such tension has recently surfaced. Regime-boosting ex-spy-turned-journalist Percy Alvarado blogged from Havana that “now undeniable signals are beginning to appear among Cuba’s enemies to use our armed institutions as a possible subject of change.”
The United States could start the process of building contacts by establishing a formal link between the U.S. Southern Command and MINFAR. Southcom's chief operations officer, a Coast Guard rear admiral, should be sent to Havana to open discussions on formalizing U.S.-Cuban collaboration in the following areas: counternarcotics, sea-air rescue, oil pollution response, port security, cruise ship emergency-response measures and other maritime matters. The Guantánamo “gate talks” could also be broadened. Liaison officers on both sides at the O-4 to O-6 ranks (Army/USMC: major-to-colonel; Navy: lieutenant commander-to-captain) should be designated to carry through. The exchange of defense attachés and inviting Cuban officers to study at U.S. war colleges should be deferred until the post-Castro period and the appointment of ambassadors.
The United States has a decidedly checkered history of dealing with military-dominated regimes around the world. So it’s vital that Washington proceed with great care and foresight in beginning to build bridges with Cuba’s military if it hopes to be able one day to steer that nation toward democracy and constructive engagement.
Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/cuba-relations-obama-revolutionary-forces-far-116158_Page2.html#ixzz3V7MZmzyg
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