The colorful characters and language games of Tres tristes tigres came to mind when I sought to envision Cuba’s future in light of President Obama’s new U.S.-Cuba policy, and my analytical exercise produced three sad scenarios.
The new policy,- followed by the elimination of Cuba from the State Department’s list of states sponsors of terrorism, the reopening of embassies, a campaign to end the embargo, and more- has created what analysts call a “new reality on the ground.” This new reality compels a rethinking of how events in Cuba may unfold over the short and intermediate terms, say over the next five to ten years. Future possibilities are infinite, and thus forecasting the future is the ultimate exercise in oversimplification. The three scenarios that follow serve mostly to focus our thinking.
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If General Castro is able to orchestrate a relatively smooth succession with no significant changes in Cuba’s political or economic model, we can expect (1) Continuity.
If the death of the Castro brothers results in a power struggle and a loss of coherence in the military/party elites, we may witness a (2) Fractured Solidarity of the Ruling Elite.
If this weakened leadership engenders deteriorating economic conditions, widespread popular discontent, etc. the best case scenario may produce a reform oriented new leadership (3) Transition. The most likely case is some form of authoritarian rule, and the worst case would be a failed state.
Each of these evolving circumstances will be impacted, in some measure, by U.S. policy responses to the unfolding of events in the Island and in the United States. How the United States government responds with policies that either accommodate or obstruct developments in Cuba will overlay other possibilities. I leave that examination for another day. Also, my statistically minded readers may wish to assign probabilities of occurrence to each one of the scenarios. I will refrain from that exercise.
If we posit that change in Cuba will not come about as a result of some U.S. or international intervention (outside-in change), nor will it come about as a result of some bottom-up event such as an Arab Spring, then we are left with top-down change. That is, change that originates within the Cuban leadership.
But the Cuban leadership lacks a democratic culture. Moreover, the Cuban ruling class has a built-in negative incentive towards democratic reforms. In any genuine transition, the nomenclature fears its institutional extinction and the disappearance or dilution of its privileges. This is not equivalent to forecasting that nothing will change in Cuba. There will be change, but a competitive, pluralistic democratic process appears very unlikely.
Of course, the imponderable, the possibility of an improbable black swan event is always present. One such black swan occurrence may be an unknown Václav Havel or Boris Yeltsin in the midst of the Cuban military that is able to emerge and consolidate power as a true reformer. But at this juncture it is hard to visualize how any of these three scenarios may offer a realistic path to a liberal democracy, or how Cuba’s future may break out of this Gordian knot.
This new reality should sadden all freedom loving people, but it is particularly painful for that generation of historical Cuban political exiles, that has fought so valiantly for a democratic outcome. We are the sad tigers.
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True, my scenarios do not offer much hope for a genuine democratic endgame in a reasonable timeframe. However, towards the end of Tres tristes tigres, Cabrera Infante teases the reader with a chapter titled “Some Revelations” where the reader anticipates answers to the perplexing conundrum of the narrative.
As if to remind us that the future is unknown and unknowable the “Revelations” chapter consists of several blank pages and indecipherable typography. The same is true for my three scenarios. The hope for freedom remains in the pages yet to be written.
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