The anniversary of Nasser’s death: Fifty-four years later, Egyptians still pay for his disastrous policies.
Dr. Ashraf Ramelah
Since the beginning of time, the mineral-rich sediment of the Nile River flooded the agricultural lands of Upper Egypt each year. Settling on the land for 40 days, the rich silt saturated the soil before pouring into the Mediterranean to provide food for sea creatures. My grandfather’s stone farmhouse stood inside the massive temporary lake. My father, as a young boy, would leap from the balcony of his childhood home into the deep, muddy waters blanketing their fields – just for fun. Before the rains pummeled the Ethiopian mountains, causing seasonal flooding, the finest cotton known to the world was harvested, leaving behind depleted soil just in time for the flood to replenish it with new layers of topsoil carried by the river mud.
Nasser pursued the High Dam project to conserve water from Ethiopia and build a gigantic hydro-electric power plant. The US government refused to finance it. The International Monetary Fund shunned the project for technical reasons, but Nasser pursued it with a vengeance. The Soviet Union agreed to build it. Present-day Egyptians call it the Nasser Dam but not to glorify him.
The negative impact of this project is known far and wide. Not only did the dam put a ligature on the flow of tons of mineral-rich river sediment increasing soil salinity and reducing to a trickle the silt into the sea, but the stagnant waters of Lake Nasser formed by the dam (300 miles long into Sudan) spread diseases such as malaria and schistosomiasis. In proximity of the new dam, Egyptian Nubians had been forced by the government to abandon their homes, and fertile farmlands were lost forever to the project. Environmental changes adversely affected local plants, wildlife and the fishing industry.
Around the dam’s 20-year anniversary in 1983, Fodor’s Egypt of Fodor’s Travel Guides wrote of the High Dam, “It has also brought a batch of new problems—many are technical and agricultural ones to which there are no immediate answers.” Water seepage, salt residue, and erosion, “are already creating problems at an alarming rate.” Fodor’s goes on to state that “from the start it was controversial.” If “the jury is still out on the High Dam” as the guide suggests back then, the verdict is clear today in the many serious problems resulting from the project. For example, now the depleted soil affects quality and quantity of crops causing the need for more imported produce and less exports and negatively impacting the economy.
In fact, many of Egypt’s ills can be traced back to Nasser.
The end of this month marks the 54th anniversary of Nasser’s death on September 28, 1970. A hero for Egyptian Nassirian’s and Arab admirers in the region during his presidential era, Nasser’s transgressions tragically impact Egypt to this day far beyond the works of any other leader. I vividly recall the public announcement of his death when I was a university student in Cairo. As I listened to the radio while drafting designs, there was a sudden switch in programing to the public broadcast system. Military music and Quranic verses began to play. This was puzzling to me at the time, but now I surmise it was to prepare the hearts and minds of his followers. Nasser was worshipped and now he was dead. What would happen to the country? How could it possibly run, even exist, without him?
Egypt and the whole Arab world were captured by this powerful, charismatic figure for 18 years who was interested in growing his personal power through public office. He was arrogant and politically narrow-minded toward ends that drove the country into destruction in many ways. Touting freedom and democracy on the morning of his coup in 1952 after snatching power from King Farouk to become the first of a long list of military presidents, Nasser used his charisma and the media to silence and mold the culture, forbidding political criticism and advice.
He would become a “sacred image” for most Egyptians. His identity was cemented over time through media depictions of a legendary leader; songs, poetry and movies programmed his megalomania even further. It took Nasser six more years to make his first autocratic move, and, gradually, into the 1960s he implemented restrictions and authoritarian controls of the country to suppress opposition to his ideas.
Certainly, this was not surprising as Nasser led the members of a secret cell of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) terrorist group known as the Free Officers. Nasser reneged on his promises to the head of the MB (Morshed) for an administrative position, then arrested and imprisoned him along with others. Beneath Nasser’s veneer of charm was his ruthless and vicious behavior.
Nasser’s regional dominance beginning with Syria, Yemen and Iraq
In 1958, Nasser extended his reach beyond Egypt with his plan to develop the Arab Umma, the union between Egypt and Syria under the name of United Arab Republic with its new flag. This was the first step in building the cornerstone for regional dominance. Ultimately, this devastated Egypt’s resources and reputation. If successful, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and other Arab countries would come under his umbrella of political leadership (Umma). The first signer of the Arab Unity Charter was President Shukri Al-Quwatli of Syria who agreed to Cairo as their new capital and Nasser as president.
Nearly four years later in October 1961, Syria appealed to the UN General Assembly to resume its former status as an independent state, Syrian Arab Republic. This was no doubt due to Nasser’s aggressive policies undertaken in Syria, such as nationalization of Syrian private banks and major industrial companies and factories that were flourishing in the fields of spinning, weaving, and cement. Egyptian immigrant workers arrived in droves to Syria’s northern region and generated an imbalance of their labor force. As a condition of acceptance to the Charter, Nasser stipulated abolition of Syria’s political pluralism in favor of a one-party system.
No doubt Syrians were as disgruntled as Egyptians would soon become when Nasser would force the same changes onto Egypt’s private industries and corporations, nationalizing them all. Egypt’s economy suffered as the existing management was replaced by inexpert military officers who ran down the companies over time, siphoning off the profits. Western governments and investors detected unstable political power running Egypt, especially when Nasser’s abuse of power reached the point of dismissing any compensation to investors whose companies were nationalized (stolen). His exercise of unjust authority against citizens further led to loss of confidence in Nasser’s regime and generated tensions.
Nasser continually announced to the country his ambitions for the Uma. His strategy was to export revolution to the neighboring Arab countries. On the morning of September 26, 1962, just six days after the installation of Imam Al Badar to the throne of Yemen, radio Sanaa (of Yemen) announced that the Yemen army took control of power. Nasser instantly supported Yemen’s military uprising by sending in the Egyptian military to oppose civilian fighting in the Yemeni streets and mountains on behalf of the deposed king – turning Yemen into a field of conflict.
Nasser failed to achieve political stability in Yemen, draining the resources of Egypt’s military and finances otherwise needed for domestic concerns. Egypt’s military presence in Yemen was extended to achieve stability but was unsuccessful and only served to foment tensions with Saudi Arabia, which viewed it as an unjustified interference in Yemen's internal affairs.
Meanwhile, Nasser’s leadership to unify the Arab countries under the banner of Arab nationalism was obstructed by President Qasim of Iraq who opposed a union with Egypt. Nasser incited Iraqi military to carry out a coup against Qasim in 1959 that failed. Three years later Nasser succeeded, and Qasim was executed by coup members. Tensions rose between Egypt and Iraq for a period. Moreover, this aggression ruined the concept of Arab nationalism and contributed to the disintegration of Arab unity. In fact, popular support from Arab countries for Nasser declined.
Nasser finally withdrew his beleaguered troops from Yemen in August 1967 after 12 years of useless fighting and saved face with the excuse of reassigning all fifteen thousand soldiers to support Egypt’s retreating soldiers on the west side of the Suez Canal.
Nasser repressed the reactions of concerned Egyptians
He imposed the state of emergency that still exists today giving powers to the government to suppress any form of opposition or dissent. He dissolved all political parties that were unsupportive of his policies. He established one single political party called the Socialist Union Party whose members spread corruption throughout the country.
To secure his position, he arrested, tortured and imprisoned fellow Muslim Brotherhood members. As a child in Cairo, I heard the pleas for freedom from behind the metal bars of a police van over its whirling siren as the Brotherhood members were rounded up. His crackdown included strict media controls over independent newspapers, magazines and radio – tightly monitoring and closing many. State media dominated the information broadcasted while the courts were used as a tool to suppress political opponents, bringing charges against them and issuing harsh sentences.
To manage political repression and monitor social and political activities, Nasser created the State Security Services. This institutionalized arrest and torture, producing a climate of fear and terror among the citizens. The agency exercised strict control over society, monitoring all aspects of daily life, art, culture, education and social activities, which took away all freedom to express opinions.
Another of Nasser’s mistaken decisions was revealed to the country in his May 1967 speech announcing that Egypt would prevent Israel’s navigation in the Red Sea. After many years of calm and no brewing tensions, Nasser instigated this conflict. His miscalculation about Egypt’s military capacity to confront the Israeli army was perhaps due to the inaccurate reports from his generals. Nonetheless, Nasser’s media statements were strong and certain of achieving victory, generating enthusiasm from Egyptians and placing pressure upon an unqualified military.
Nasser was later said to be in the dark concerning his army’s lack of adequate preparation for war. Nasser admitted this at the time and exploited the fact to gain sympathy. Egypt’s military was inept at coordinating the militaries of neighboring Arab countries. Nasser’s earlier foreign interference lost him the respect of other leaders, which no doubt contributed to his failure to form allies in what would become the Five Days War. After provoking Israel to initiate the war, Nasser closed the Strait of Tiran. Egypt’s army was annihilated and lost the Sinai Peninsula to Israel.
The current degradation of Egyptian society began 70 years ago with Nasser’s socialist reforms and transgressions. Although the dream of the United Arab Republic expired with him, the remains of Nasser’s domestic initiatives formed the devastating trajectory the country would take well into the future.
