inflict higher costs on the minority. Here is a simple illustration borrowed from political scholar Ilya Somin:
Consider a policy that creates $100 of benefits for each person in 51 percent of the population at a cost of $200 for each person in the other 49 percent of the population. In this illustration, the harm imposed on the minority ($200 x 49 = $9,800) is almost twice as much as the benefit to the majority ($100 x 51 = $5,100). And yet, a self-interested democratic majority is likely to adopt this policy.
The underlying proposition here is whether selfish voting behavior undermines democracy itself. Does democracy require altruistic voters? It may be tempting to answer no; but we must keep in mind the consequences from voters in the Jim Crow-era in the American South, voters in the anti-Semitic Germany of the Weimar Republic, or more recently, voters in the newly democratized countries in the Muslim world.
If voting behavior is self-interested, we need constraints on the scope of government powers to prevent a majority from engineering undesirable policy outcomes. Limiting government power is necessary to mitigate the potential problems of selfish voting behavior, and also the excesses of sociotropic voting.
Unfortunately, in the United States, the executive branch of the federal government alone has grown to fifteen cabinet-level departments, fifty-six independent regulatory agencies, and four “quasi-official” agencies (Somin). And, total government spending accounts for over 36 percent of U.S. Gross Domestic Product.
We continue to increase the scope of government and it is not clear to me if this is because we vote sociotropically or because we vote selfishly. But, as F.A. Hayek reminded us: “Thought democracy is probably the best form of limited government, it becomes an absurdity if it turns into unlimited government.”
No comments:
Post a Comment